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The RDF stations on the east coast picked up the Heinkels and their escort when they were still far out to sea. Their first estimate was that more than twenty aircraft were approaching, but later they raised the figure to more than thirty, and finally to more than fifty. The stations said, correctly, that the aircraft were flying in three distinct formations.
Air Vice-Marshal R.E. Saul DFC commanding No 13 Group, was less well known to the public than his colleagues to the south, whose forces were in the thick of the fighting throughout the battle. August 15 gave him his first chance of countering a big attack in daylight. In spite of the enormous area he had to cover, he made such good use of it that it also proved to be his last, for the Germans never repeated the experiment.
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Saul's position at noon, when the Heinkels of Kampfgeschwader 26 and the Messerschmitt 110s of Zerstorergeschwader 76 were first detected miles away over the North Sea, was that he had three squadrons of Spitfires, one of Hurricanes and one of Blenheims in the two sectors which covered the north of England. Of the remaining eight squadrons which made up the resources of his group, four and a half were far away in Northern Ireland, Shetland and the north of Scotland. To supplement the five squadrons he had immediately at hand, he could count only on two and a half squadrons of Hurricanes near the Firth of Forth and a squadron of Defiants near the Clyde. The Blenheims were no match even for long-range fighters, while the Defiants had suffered crippling losses in their last encounter with the Germans and were at least a hundred miles from any objective which Stumpff was likely to attack.
Saul began by sending one of the four single-seater squadrons close at hand to meet the enemy well off the coast. At the same time he brought down a squadron of Hurricanes from the Firth of Forth to patrol the Tyneside - an almost unprecedented step. As the threat became more imminent he added the remaining three single-seater squadrons immediately available, keeping back only the Blenheims, the Defiants, and a squadron and a half of Hurricanes near the Forth. By this time correctly appreciating that he had the greater part of Stumpff's resources on his front, he nevertheless responded to a call for reinforcement from No 12 Group, on his southern flank, by parting with the Blenheims, his only uncommitted squadron within reach. Like Brand (Air Vice-Marshal Sir Q. Brand AOC of 10 Group) in face of Sperrle's threat on the 13th, at least he ran little risk of being caught by Stumpff with his aircraft on the ground.
Meanwhile, to seaward of the Farne Islands, the Spitfires of No 72 Squadron from Acklington were closing with Stumpff's escorted bombers at the rate of something like eight miles per minute. In the absence of a squadron-leader, they were led by Flight-Lieutenant Edward Graham, who thus stepped into the place of honour in one of the most spectacularly successful air combats of the war.
Thirty miles off the coast, the squadron sighted the enemy - a hundred aircraft to their eleven. As the RDF stations had predicted, the Germans were flying in three formations - the bombers ahead and the fighters in two waves stepped up to the rear. Misled by the supplementary fuel tanks slung below the fighters, which looked like bombs, Graham and his pilots took the nearer wave for Junkers 88s.
Stumpff's armada was so vast in comparison with Graham's little force that he hesitated for a moment, uncertain at what point and from what direction to attack it. Apparently unable to bear the suspense, one of his pilots asked whether he had seen the enemy. With a slight stutter which was habitual, he replied " Of course I've seen the b-b-b-bastards, I'm trying to w-w-w-work out what to do." The reply became famous through-out Fighter Command.
He did not hesitate for long, The Spitfires had had plenty of time to gain height during their long flight from the coast, and were about three thousand feet above the enemy's mean height. Making the most of his advantage and of what corresponded to the weather-gauge, he decided to lead the squadron in a diving attack from up-sun, leaving each pilot free to choose his own target. Two-thirds attacked bombers or supposed bombers, the remaining third the second wave of fighters, correctly identified as 110s.
The results were startling. Jettisoning their external tanks, some of the 110s formed the usual defensive circle, while others dived almost to sea level and were last seen heading east. The bombers, less an indeterminate number destroyed by Graham's squadron, then split into two formations, each accompanied by some of the remaining fighters. One formation headed for Tyneside, apparently with the intention of bombing Saul's sector station at Usworth; the rest turned south-east towards two aerodromes at Linton on Ouse and Dishforth which they had been ordered to attack.
The first formation, engaged successively by the remaining squadron from Acklington, the Tyne guns and some of the Hurricanes which had come south from Scotland, dropped most of their bombs in the sea. The second, engaged by a squadron of Spitfires from Catterick, a Hurricane squadron from Usworth and the Tees guns, dropped theirs almost as ineffectively near Sunderland and Seaham Harbour. From first to last Saul's fighters, backed by the guns of the 7th Anti-Aircraft Division under Major-General R.B. Pargiter, destroyed eight Heinkels and seven 110s without suffering a single casualty. It is known that in addition to the enemy losses reported in this diary during this period, many German aircraft got back to their bases with battle damage varying from a few bullet holes to a total write-off on crash landing.
While these excitements were at their height, the fifty Junkers 88s which made up the rest of Stumpff's bomber force were speeding across the North Sea towards their objective in South Yorkshire, a bomber aerodrome at Great Driffield. About a quarter of an hour before the first shot was fired off the Farne Islands, warning was received in the operations room of No 12 Group at Watnall that German aircraft were approaching the front of the group's Church Fenton sector, but were still a long way out to sea." .... Here the direct quotes from the story end, but a resume of the rest of the action in the north, is that .... Air Vice-Marshal Saul was even able to lend No 12 Groups AOC - Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory - his squadron of Blenheims to help in the defence of the airfield at Driffield which was bombed, as was Bridlington. The Blenheims were lent even though Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory had squadrons nearer to him available to fight, than Air Vice-Marshal Saul had at the beginning of the action.
Luftflotte 5 was finished in the daylight battle, apart from reconnaissance, and most of its bomber strength and some of its fighters were transferred to Luftflotte 2, based in France, towards the end of August.
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